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Has Lisbon presented the EU with the necessary toolkit to close the gap between expectations and capabilities? 
Yes and no. The Treaty does little to simplify or clarify the institutional obfuscations of Brussels. It does not 
whittle down the layers of decision-making, or open up new routes by which to better engage with the 
Commission or the Parliament. And it remains to be seen whether the entire edifice of the EU will be made any 
more relevant to the daily lives of Europeans. Ironically however, in the area of foreign policy – the issue most 
likely to raise the hackles of Member States because it impinges upon their sovereign prerogative – the Treaty’s 
innovations have prompted little controversy. Indeed, the buzz on the proverbial boulevard is of little else than 
who will fill the new high-powered seats of President of the EU Council and High Representative of the EU for 
Foreign Affairs. Here, the Lisbon Treaty may at last be able to bridge the gap between potential and 
competence. 
The EU’s own external affairs mirror the complicated nature of the EU itself. Divided areas of authority 
between Member States and the institutions produce instance of principles that are long on procedure but 
frequently short on substance. Nevertheless, the EU has since the first ‘big’ treaty of Maastricht in 1993, 
developed into a real, if not always robust regional actor. It is now a major international player in a number of 
strategic areas, including trade humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and climate change. Its own in-house foreign 
policy of enlargement, and its traditional links of development with formerdomaine privé in Africa, the 
Caribbean and Pacific have also extended its influence considerably. This is due to organisational vision on the 
part of the Council, and the institutional clout of the European Commission. 
For a complex, multi-tier actor like the EU, the ability to act in concert on the world stage depends to a large 
extent upon how flexible the idea of foreign policy is. The EU is certainly capable of constructing a series of 
generic guidelines by which it can regulate and expand its relationship with neighbours near and far. However, 
when pushed by external circumstances into reactively producing a coherent position, the EU is less good. All 
too frequently, the foreign policy fabric of the EU unravels, with gaps emerging between the Commission and 
the Council, or between one of the institutions and the Member States, just at the time when a foreign issue – or 
audience – most requires EU unity. 
Unlike its Member States, EU foreign policies are an aggregate feature, an example of summative diplomacy, 
which is the function of the EU’s own cumulative composition. However, like its constituent national units, the 
EU requires dedicated mechanisms, personnel and vision to construct and sustain a foreign policy by which to 
define and defend itself. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty come a host of new foreign policy ‘add-ons’, 
helping to upgrade the EU in its quest for greater international ‘actorness’. The time is certainly right. Recent 
opinion polls suggest that a majority of Europeans too feel strong about a clearer role for the EU, provided that 
Lisbon helps streamline its actions, rather than diffusing its impact. 
Whilst the European media is full of stories about the new President of the European Council and the High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs, the third development of an EU Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
appears to have fallen off the radar, despite fierce turf wars erupting across Brussels as to its proper role. The 
European External Action Service (EEAS) is designed to comprise a future EU diplomatic corps. The EEAS is 
ambiguously outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, and while not designed to replace the mechanisms of bilateral 
diplomacy, it certainly provides an additional instrument by which the EU can coalesce around a given issue 
area. This has the benefit of increasing its ability to present a united front to external audiences, and the 
drawback of appearing to critics to transform the EU into a more federated entity. 
Divisions have arisen however as to the role of the EEAS. The current Swedish Presidency views the EEAS as 
an entity separate from the Council of Ministers and the Commission, a service provider responsible solely to 
the new High Representative. The European Parliament however – as witnessed by its rushed resolution of 22 
October – is keen to stake its claim on the EEAS as an entity situated within the shadow of the Commission, 
from where the EP can extend its ability to scrutinize its various doings and spendings. The Commission will 
clearly have much to say about integrating the EEAS into its own administrative structure, particularly in 
relation to the current responsibilities of DG Relex, TREN and Enlargement. 
Despite the excellent auditing work of the European Parliament in bringing the mis-managed and unwieldy 
European Commission to heel in 1999, the EEAS need not be situated within the institutional structure of the 
Commission simply because it would come under Parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, if comprised of young, merit-
based European citizens keen on directing the new Lisbon-ified EU, the EEAS should be the most democratic 
and representative of the EU’s institutions, and thus the least in need of such oversight. Instead, the EEAS 
should remain an autonomous entity, serving the CFSP High Representative. The DGs with responsibility for 
various international affairs are still struggling to keep inter-DG warfare to a minimum, and do not need the 
added complication of yet another foreign policy forum. The CFSP High Rep however, needs skilled 
researchers, analysts, desk officers and budding diplomats capable of streamlining the data produced by the 
Commission and properly transforming it into new patterns of EU action. 
The EU is not a classic foreign policy player, and many of its foreign policy areas, from enlargement to climate 
change do not fit the classic diplomatic mould.  The portfolio-approach to the DGs has at least helped keep these 
separate; whilst the Council and Parliament attempts to find cross-issue methods to keep them connected. The 
EEAS can serve the EU best in two ways. As an ‘in-house service provider’, the EEAS should act as a 
repository that consolidates positions on foreign policy between the national capitals and the institutions. 
Abroad, it can provide a visible diplomatic presence, strengthening the Union’s presence in key theatres around 
the world. The EEAS should provide the content of EU foreign policy, whilst the High Representative and 
Council President provide the form.  Together, the two can work to define, and then advance the EU’s common 
foreign policy goals. Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn had it right in stressing ‘the wide range of policy 
instruments at our disposal’ as a result of Lisbon, in which the EEAS operates as ‘the engine of our smart 
power’. The EEAS stands the best chance of becoming a true catalyst for EU foreign policy if it is least 
institutionally hamstrung (EurActive, 22 October, 2009). 
 
